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The birth of the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency, or ABMA, like other events in history, was not an arbitrary novelty. As
World War II ended, many of the top scientists of the German Army's Peenemunde Rocket
Center group led by Dr. Wernher von Braun surrendered to American military forces. At that
time, the Army offered employment in the United States to a select group of these
ballistic missile developers. The code name "Project PAPERCLIP" was given to the
secret operation of establishing these scientists and technicians in the United States to
assist with rocket and missile development. By December 1945, Von Braun and over 100
Germans had been moved to Fort Bliss, Texas.
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Following World
War II, disputes between
the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, particularly over the Soviet takeover of
East European states, led Winston Churchill to warn in 1946 that an "iron
curtain" was descending through the middle of Europe. For his part, Joseph Stalin
deepened the estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union when he asserted
in 1946 that World War III was an unavoidable and inevitable consequence of
"capitalist imperialism" and implied that such a war might occur.
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The United States, having participated in the Korean
action, was now indeed aware that her World War II comrade-in-arms was no longer a comrade
but still in arms. The Soviets made dramatic breakthroughs in nuclear fission, and their
concentration on missiles and rocketry had become common knowledge. The US Army had also
taken some steps on its own initiative. In 1950, the Army
relocated the Peenemunde team under Von Braun, moving personnel and equipment from Fort
Bliss to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
By 1955, there were indications that the Soviet Union had made
significant technological gains, especially in the guided missile field. This included
developmental progress in weapon systems of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (or ICBM)
and intermediate-range ballistic missile (or IRBM) capabilities. Reports circulated by the
media in the United States mentioned a "missile gap" between United States and
the Soviets. Public opinion demanded the perfection of similar weapons in a short order.
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JUPITER
Shown in front row (left to right) are
Secretary of Navy Dan Thomas, Secretary of Defense Charles E.
Wilson, and Secretary of Army Wilber Brucker. In back row are MG J.
B. Medaris, ABMA Commander; James H. Smith, Assistant Secretary of
Navy for Air; LTG James Gavin and W. E. Martin, who are in charge of
research and development operations for the Army.
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On 8 November 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson issued a
significant decision concerning this nation's long-range ballistic missile program.
Wilson's orders covered the long-range ballistic missile program, which included two ICBMs
and two IRBMs. All were to be afforded the highest national priority, with a qualifying
stipulation that the IRBMs were not to interfere with ICBM development. The Army, in
cooperation with the Navy, was to develop IRBM #2 (later named the JUPITER) to achieve an
early land- and sea-based capability. To direct the program from the top level, a joint
Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee (or January-BMC) was established, with the Secretary of
the Navy serving as Chairman and the Secretary of the Army as Vice Chairman. They, in
turn, reported to the Ballistic Missile Committee, which the Secretary of Defense
established in his office. Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker and Army Chief of Staff
Maxwell D. Taylor relayed the word to all army elements that the IRBM #2 program was to
carry top priority in the Army.
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Part 2
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