CHAPTER IIIMISSILE & ROCKET SYSTEMS DEPLOYED TO SOUTHWEST ASIA
OPERATION DESERT STORM STRATEGY In the moonless early morning dark of 17 January 1991,eight AH-64 APACHE helicopters belonging to the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) sped across the border into Iraq and launched laser-guided HELLFIRE missiles against two early-warning ground control radar sites. Using night vision goggles and Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) capability to maneuver in complete darkness, "Task Force Normandy successfully provided a `radar-black corridor' to initiate the air campaign" against Iraq. The APACHEs' HELLFIRE missiles and 2.75- inch HYDRA-70 rockets, fired at precisely 0238, completely destroyed the Iraqi radar sites within 4 minutes. These opening shots of the coalition air way marked the beginning of the "Desert Storm" that would ultimately succeed in driving Iraq out of Kuwait.1 The strategy developed primarily by GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command during Operation Desert Storm, was based on the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine which originated in 1981. The basic principles of this doctrine emphasized initiative, agility, synchronization, and depth. To neutralize the enemy's identified "center of gravity," strategists had to exploit the weaknesses of the opposing force while reinforcing there own strengths through the coordinated use of naval forces,mobile land troops, air superiority, and control of communications and intelligence gathering systems. The coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait was "an effective demonstration of the successful application of the principles of AirLand Battle... ." The aim of the air war phase of Operation Desert Storm was to seize control of the skies within the theater of operations thereby helping to ensure "the destruction of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's offensive military capability." The U.S., British, Saudi, and Kuwaiti predawn sorties of 17 January 1991 targeted Iraq's airfields, air defense network, and command-and- control centers. During the first 14 hours of the air war, 18,000 tons of explosives were unloaded during the more than 500 combat sorties flown. An impressive 80 percent of these initial combat missions were considered successful. Between 17 January and 28 February 1991, over 116,000 allied air combat sorties were flown. In addition to the aforementioned targets, these round-the- clock air strikes destroyed fixed-site missile launchers, bridges, artillery, supply lines, nuclear research facilities, chemical weapons factories, biological warfare production plants, utilities, communication systems, and key government buildings. Iraqi ground troops and support facilities also suffered the demoralizing and deadly effects of constant bombardment. Along with various munitions, coalition aircraft also dropped about 14 million leaflets urging Iraqi soldiers to surrender and explaining the procedure for doing so. Although the air campaign dramatically began the isolation and destruction of the Iraqi forces inside Kuwait, allied air power alone was not sufficient to dislodge the troops and tanks dug into defensive positions along the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq or inside the occupied territory. However, by destroying the Iraqi high command's ability to adequately communicate with its troops or to effectively monitor the coalition's preparations for a ground offensive, the air campaign allowed allied forces to execute the final moves of the detailed strategy designed to liberate Kuwait and "...to deny Iraq the ability to conduct offensive operations for at least a decade." The air war's success in eliminating much of the threat posed by Iraqi artillery and reducing the military effectiveness of Iraq's front line troops also helped to contain the number of casualties suffered by allied forces during the ground war. In keeping with the principles of AirLand Battle doctrine, General Schwarzkopf devised a ground war plan by which the U.S.-led coalition would outflank, encircle, then destroy "...the offensive capability of the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations." Using a diversionary frontal assault and a classic "Hail Mary" football play type of maneuver, the allied forces launched a massive, undetected rear armor assault on 24 February 1991 which totally confounded and cut off the Iraqi army in Kuwait. By 28 February, the so-called "100 Hours War" quickly completed the liberation of the emirate and forced Iraq to accept U.N. cease fire terms as well as the Security Council resolutions passed since the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. On 7 March 1991, CENTCOM estimated Iraqi losses as a result of Operation Desert Storm as follows: 36 fixed-wing aircraft and 6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements; 68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground; 137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran; 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks (86 percent); 2,400 of 2,870 other armored vehicles (84 percent); 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces (84 percent); 19 naval ships sunk and 6 damaged; and 42 divisions made combat- ineffective. The U.S. forces released over 70,000 captured Iraqi prisoners of war to Saudi control. Estimates of Iraqi combat casualties ranged from 25,000 to 100,000. Deaths among non-combatants in both Iraq and Kuwait were also estimated to be in the thousands. High Technology Warfare During the days preceding the escalation of Operation Desert Shield into Operation Desert Storm, speculation was rampant about the cost in American lives of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Private analysts in the United States estimated that American troop casualties could range from a low of 500 to a high of 30,000. Based on the results of mock battles against replicas of Iraqi fortifications and other frontal assault training exercises, U.S. military experts calculated that anywhere from one-third to one-half of ground troops could be killed. In late January 1991, Army commanders in Southwest Asia warned combat doctors about the possibility of a projected 10 percent casualty rate over a 30-day period. Estimates for the wounded fluctuated from a low of 2,500 to more than 16,000. The Iraqi government and media tried to exploit American fears about high casualties. An editorial published on the front page of the ruling Baath Arab Socialist Party newspaper in early January 1991 claimed that, "The American president is still deluded by the paper calculations drawn by the Pentagon that he can control the theater of operations....The price which Bush will pay is not only the U.S. defeat and the loss of U.S. strategic interests, but rivers of Americans' blood." Less than a week before the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein made a speech in Baghdad denigrating U.S. military capabilities: "The Americans will come here to perform acrobatics like Rambo movies. But they will find here real people to fight them.... They think that the Iraqi command has weak nerves and that the Iraqis will be shaken. We are a people who have eight years of experience in war and combat.... All the technological advancement will be tested on the battleground. They will see how their weapons will be shot down.... They will see how the Iraqis--men, youngsters and women--will fight them should they attempt to land anywhere in Iraq." Contrary to Iraqi rhetoric and braggadocio as well as the pessimistic probabilities of homegrown prognosticators, the actual numbers of U.S. casualties and wounded in action were astonishingly albeit gratifyingly low. By the end of Operation Desert Storm, American troops had suffered 148 battle deaths, 145 non-battle deaths, and 467 wounded in action. Of course, a lot of credit for these minimal figures must be given to the well-trained, highly motivated soldiers who successfully executed the devastatingly thorough AirLand Battle strategy mapped out by the allied command. But without the sophisticated weaponry available to coalition strategists and soldiers, this highly effective plan of action would probably not have been drafted. The U.S.military establishment's faith in the efficacy of "high-tech" weapon systems was vindicated during Operation Desert Storm. The accuracy and lethality of the precision munitions fired at or dropped on Iraqi troops and targets during the air war were not only incapacitating but demoralizing. The heavy artillery barrage and aerial bombardment of Iraqi defensive positions along the Saudi border and inside Kuwait just before "G-day" on 24 February 1991 further weakened the military effectiveness of these troops. This in turn lessened the danger faced by coalition forces during the opening moves of the ground offensive. "Smart" weapons also proved themselves against Iraqi tanks, armored vehicles, other hardened targets, berms, other types of fortifications, and Scud missiles. Of all the U.S.-made weapons deployed in SWA, however, none proved to be more reliable or effective than those Army missiles, rockets, and other systems managed and supported by the organizations located at Redstone Arsenal , Alabama.
Redstone Arsenal Weapon Systems in Southwest Asia Virtually every one of the fielded Army missile systems managed and supported at Redstone Arsenal were sent to SWA. Three general types of missiles were deployed. Among the air defense systems sent to the Persian Gulf were CHAPARRAL; HAWK; STINGER in its manportable, AVENGER, and Air-to-Air STINGER (ATAS) configurations; and PATRIOT. Of these systems only the PATRIOT was fired in combat during Operation Desert Storm. Kuwaiti air defense units fired HAWK missiles during the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990. However, the coalition's command of the skies over Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait after the beginning of the air war on 17 January 1991 eliminated targets for the other U.S. Army air defense missile systems deployed in SWA. Most of the antiarmor missiles dispatched to the theater of operations "...performed very well" during the conflict. These systems included DRAGON, HELLFIRE, SHILLELAGH, and TOW in both its airborne and ground configurations. Only the SHILLELAGH was not used in combat during Operation Desert Storm. All of the artillery missile systems sent to SWA, including Army TACMS, HYDRA-70, and MLRS, were fired during both the air and ground offensives. HYDRA- 70 rockets were among the opening shots of the first air strike against Iraq on 17 January 1991. Both the MLRS and Army TACMS, two systems which made their combat debut in the Persian Gulf War, "...performed superbly." The Missile Command also supported other systems such as the G/VLLD, the MMS, the M-901 ITV, the FAAR, and various night sights that provided coalition forces with a night-fighting capability not available to the opposing Iraqi army. In addition, "the extremely accurate laser guided bombs that were so effective during the air war were a modern version of a concept that came out of MICOM's [RD&E Center] ...more than 25 years ago." Missile Descriptions and Use in Southwest Asia The "...stellar performance of [the] Army missiles in Southwest Asia" made many of these weapon systems household words not only in the United States but in countries all over the world. Some of the missiles even acquired popular nicknames indicative of their effectiveness against Iraqi troops and missiles. The PATRIOT missile was dubbed the "Scud buster" because of its impressive record of highly visible Scud missile kills. Captured Iraqi soldiers referred to the MLRS as "steel rain" because of the destruction inflicted by the rockets' individual bomblets as well as for the heavy barrages' psychological impact on effected troops. The following descriptions of the systems deployed to SWA and their use in combat (if any) demonstrate why in the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, "both the Army and defense analysts [expected] the weapons to be devastatingly effective against Iraqi tanks and aircraft."
The Army TACMS Block I, a replacement for the LANCE missile system, is an inertially-guided missile with a range of more than 100 kilometers. A precision munition, the Army TACMS has more than 900 high explosive, fist sized bomblets that detonate on contact. Fielded with MLRS units, the missile is fired from the same launcher. Army TACMS is designed to destroy tactical missile launchers; suppress air defense; attack command, control, and communication sites; and disrupt logistics. The Army TACMS Block II is a candidate system to fill the requirement to destroy enemy armored combat vehicles at long ranges. One of the outstanding success stories of ODS, fielding of the Army TACMS was accomplished ahead of schedule in August 1990 using the initial operational test and evaluation (IOTE) unit, the 6/27th Field Artillery (FA) Battalion from Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The unit was initially deployed to SWA with the XVIII Airborne Corps, but A Battery, one of the unit's two Army TACMS-capable firing batteries, was later placed under the operational control of VII Corps. It was this battery which on 18 January 1991 launched the first two Army TACMS missiles ever to be fired in combat. Production of the system was accelerated in order to meet the ODS requirement. A total of 105 Army TACMS missiles were deployed to SWA, 32 of which were successfully fired against surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, logistics sites,artillery and rocket battery positions, and tactical bridges. According to LTG Thomas J. Kelly, Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Army TACMS in SWA was "...spectacularly successful. We...[used] it in certain efforts which [were] extremely high priority. It ...really delivered." A mobile light air defense system with a turret mounted on a tracked vehicle carrying four ready- to-fire missiles, the CHAPARRAL is a ground launched version of the air-to-air SIDEWINDER. CHAPARRAL is the Army's standard, short range, low altitude air defense system which provides point defense of vital corps areas against direct air attack. It homes in on the heat given off by the target aircraft's engine exhaust and is used against helicopters and low flying fixed-wing jets. Although U.S. forces have never fired this missile in combat, the system has been successfully used under such conditions by allies of the United States. A manportable, shoulder fired, antitank missile, the DRAGON has a medium range of about 1,000 meters and weighs about 35 pounds. In addition to tanks, the DRAGON can be used against gun emplacements and fortified positions.The system consists of an expendable round and reusable tracker with a day/night sight. It is deployed in airborne and infantry divisions, both light and mechanized; armored cavalry and Ranger regiments; and special forces. The DRAGON is used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps as well as about 14 foreign countries. The system is co-produced with Switzerland. The prime contractor is currently replacing the basic warhead with a new, more lethal design. The improved system is called DRAGON II. Of all the MICOM-supported systems deployed during the Persian Gulf conflict, the DRAGON was one of the most criticized by both defense analysts and Army officials. The three areas of most concern were the difficulty encountered when aiming; exposure of the gunner to enemy fire; and the missile's inability to penetrate the better layered or newer reactive modern armor. But as David G. Harris, MICOM Public Affairs Officer, pointed out in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in February 1991, "...it is all we have, and we believe it will do the job against the armor we'll see in the Gulf." Although considered to be "a weapon of last resort," a few DRAGONs were fired during combat in SWA. The HAWK is a medium range, surface-to-air guided missile that provides air defense coverage against low- to medium-altitude aircraft. It is a mobile, all-weather day and night system. The missile is highly lethal, reliable, and effective against electronic countermeasures. Basic HAWK was developed in the 1950s and initially fielded in 1960. The system has been upgraded through a series of product improvements beginning with Improved HAWK in 1970. The Phase III product improvement and the latest missile modification are currently being fielded to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army National Guard as well as 20 allied nations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and several countries in both SWA and Southeast Asia (SEA), are also equipped with the HAWK system. Although HAWK missile batteries were deployed by the U.S. Army during the conflicts in Vietnam and SWA, American troops have never fired this weapon in combat. The first combat usage of HAWK occurred in 1967 when Israel successfully fired the missiles during the Six Day War with Egypt. Even though it was not used by the coalition during Operation Desert Storm, the HAWK missile system did see action during the Persian Gulf War. Kuwaiti air defense units equipped with U.S. HAWK antiaircraft missiles downed about 22 Iraqi aircraft and one combat helicopter during the invasion of 2 August 1990. The system later posed a possible threat to the U.S.-led coalition because Iraqi forces captured both HAWK and TOW missiles in Kuwait. In January 1991, the official Iraqi news agency claimed that two of the captured HAWK batteries were operational, while three others would be combat ready later that month. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was reportedly told by his military chiefs that, "Our fighters are now ready to use [the captured HAWK batteries] against the planes of invasion and aggression in order to make their weapons backfire with the determination derived from your own." Although MICOM officials initially believed that Iraq would be too unfamiliar with the system to be able to use it, later there was speculation that "...Iraq may have gained its expertise from captured Kuwaiti soldiers...." Regardless of Iraq's stated plans to employ U.S.-made missiles against the U.S.-led coalition, MICOM spokesman Dave Harris noted: "Our guys know what the capabilities of the HAWK are and the capabilities of Basic TOW are and what they should do if they are used against them. We have known since August the Iraqis had captured Hawks and TOWs in Kuwait, and we've done what had to be done to make sure people knew what the capabilities of those systems are." Actions to counteract this threat were implemented at the start of Operation Desert Shield. Because the HAWK was vulnerable to American electronic warfare systems, the U.S. Air Force reprogrammed the missile jammers on its aircraft to thwart Iraq's attempted use of the captured HAWKs. About 90 percent of this software modification was completed within 48 hours of the aircraft's arrival in Saudi Arabia, with all being upgraded within 72 hours of landing. In addition, aircraft radar warning receivers were enhanced to accommodate HAWK radar signals. Because of the HAWK's distinctive radar signature, any Iraqi efforts to train on the captured systems were expected to be immediately visible to watching allied forces. This "Blue-Gray" threat--so-called because it is posed by "a U.S. or allied-produced weapon in the hands of the adversary"--was one which U.S. military officials were confident could be successfully counteracted. HELLFIRE is an air-to-ground missile system designed to defeat tanks and other individual targets while minimizing the exposure of the launch vehicle to enemy fire. HELLFIRE uses laser guidance and is designed to accept other guidance packages. It is used on helicopters against heavily armored vehicles at longer standoff distances than other Army missiles now in the inventory. Current launch platforms include the AH-64 APACHE helicopter and the Navy AH-1W. The system is also qualified for use on the UH-60 BLACKHAWK, and has been tested for use on the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the ITV. As previously mentioned, the first shots of Operation Desert Storm occurred on 17 January 1991 when eight APACHE helicopters used HELLFIRE missiles and HYDRA-70 rockets to destroy two Iraqi early-warning ground control radar sites. However, this was not the first time that HELLFIRE missiles had been fired in combat. Over a year before, U.S. Army troops successfully used HELLFIRE against seven targets during Operation Just Cause in Panama. "One of the Army's premier antitank weapons systems," an estimated 2,900 to 4,000 HELLFIRE missiles were fired during Operation Desert Storm, 80 to 90 percent of which were judged to have hit their target. The system proved itself to be very effective against a variety of moving and stationary targets, including tanks (APACHE helicopters destroyed over 50 Iraqi tanks in one battle alone), other armored vehicles, radar sites, bunkers, and other fortified positions. HELLFIRE missiles were also unintentionally involved in several "friendly fire" incidents during Operation Desert Storm. Of the 148 Americans killed in combat in SWA, 35 died as a result of fratricide. Because "the Hellfire can operate at longer ranges than [APACHE pilots] can identify [targets]," pilots were unable at times to distinguish between Iraqi and coalition forces thereby increasing their chances of inadvertently causing the death of a fellow soldier. To reduce such incidents in future conflicts, the Army is now studying several options for identifying future ground vehicles. An unguided air-to-ground rocket which uses a variety of warheads, the 2.75-inch HYDRA-70 rocket system is fired from helicopters by the Army and from both jets and helicopters by the Air Force and Navy. The current version has a new rocket motor, new warheads, and other improved components that greatly enhance the system's performance. Rockets have been bought by Japan, Pakistan, Jordan, Kenya, Egypt, Taiwan, and Honduras. Launchers have been sold to El Salvador, Korea,Thailand, Jordan, and Egypt. Literally millions of these munitions were fired in Vietnam. Helicopters armed with HYDRA-70 rockets were also deployed in Operation Just Cause as well as ODS. The APACHE helicopters that opened the air campaign by destroying two radar sites inside Iraq with HELLFIRE missiles also used HYDRA-70 rockets which "...hit and scattered thousands of razor-sharp flechettes" across the sites. The 2.75-inch munitions also proved useful during the ground phase of the Gulf War. Members of the 2d Battalion, 229th Attack Helicopter Regiment from Fort Rucker, Alabama, used primarily 30-mm chain guns and 2.75-inch rockets against the fortified positions and large bunker complexes they encountered during the second day of the ground offensive. The MLRS is a large (13-foot) unguided artillery rocket mounted on a tracked mobile launcher. Each launch vehicle carries two clusters of six rockets--called "six packs" by U.S. soldiers--all of which can be fired in less than 60 seconds. The MLRS warhead contains 644 high explosive grenades for antipersonnel and light vehicle engagement. Alternative warheads now in development include the Sense & Destroy Armor (SADARM) and the Terminally Guided Submunition (TGSM). The rocket has a range of over 30 kilometers. As it nears the target, the rocket warhead splits open, ejecting grenades which fall to earth in a pattern and detonate on contact. This weapon is effective against troop concentrations, trucks and other unarmored vehicles, storage sites, and enemy weapons emplacements. The MLRS launcher is also used for the Army TACMS and the Ground Launched Tacit Rainbow, a cruise missile used against enemy radars. The governments of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France are currently participating in production of MLRS launchers and basic rockets in their nations for fielding to their respective forces. Like the Army TACMS, MLRS was first fired in combat during Operation Desert Storm. The system's initial trial by combat occurred on the evening of 13 February 1991 "somewhere near the Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait tri-border area..." when the 21st Field Artillery's Alpha Battery engaged in an artillery raid on targets in southern Iraq. The battery was used as a single firing unit, with all 10 of its MLRS launchers lined up along a 3-kilometer stretch. During the fight, more than 100 rockets were fired on several enemy positions in less than 1 minute. During the course of the Persian Gulf conflict, Alpha Battery fired 550 rockets, the second highest MLRS battery in total missions and total rockets fired. The top MLRS battery in SWA was A Battery, 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery (MLRS), Oklahoma Army National Guard which fired 699 rockets during the raids and actual ground war. In all, U.S. Army artillery units fired over 17,000 MLRS rockets against Iraqi howitzer and rocket battalions, air defense artillery (ADA) battalions, command and control facilities, and logistics facilities. The MLRS proved to be "...extremely effective and very dependable..." throughout the conflict in SWA. The overall success of this system in combat was succinctly characterized by the VII Corps Artillery Commander when he stated,"MLRS is gangbusters." British forces also fired the MLRS in combat for the first time during Operation Desert Storm. According to LTC Peter Williams, Commander of Britain's 39th Heavy Artillery Regiment in Saudi Arabia, "It's the decisive battle winner. We call ourselves the Grid Square Removal System because the rockets from each launcher can take out a square kilometer of the map." Perhaps the most telling moniker attached to this weapon system during the Persian Gulf crisis, however, was that coined by the Iraqi troops who had to endure long hours of bombardment by coalition MLRS units. Captured Iraqi soldiers referred to the grenades dispersed by the MLRS as "steelrain." The deadly downpour rapidly dampened the Iraqi will to fight, helping to blast a significant psychological breach in Iraqi defensive positions in Kuwait. This mental opening ultimately translated into droves of Iraqi soldiers who voluntarily surrendered rather than endure further punishment from the MLRS maelstrom. PATRIOT is the U.S. Army's newest, most advanced air defense system. Capable of defeating both high performance aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles, it is the only operational air defense system that can shoot down attacking missiles. A PATRIOT battery (i.e., the basic firing unit) consists of a phased array radar, an engagement control station, computers, power generating equipment, and up to eight launchers, each of which holds four ready-to-fire missiles. There are about 100 soldiers assigned to a battery, but three soldiers in the engagement control station are the only personnel required to operate the battery in combat. In addition to U.S. units, the PATRIOT is deployed with the military forces of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Without a doubt, the PATRIOT was the most spectacular and well-known of the U.S. Army missiles used in SWA. Not long after its first combat firing in January 1991, the system became known worldwide as the "Scudbuster" because of its highly publicized, visually impressive use against Iraq's most potent weapon of fear: the Iraqi-modified, Soviet-made Scud-B surface-to- surface missile capable of carrying chemical warheads. The first PATRIOT unit to deploy to Saudi Arabia--Battery B, 2d Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, 11th ADA Brigade--arrived in country on 13 August 1990. Less than 5 months later, at 0448 on 18 January 1991, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 7th ADA, 11th ADA Brigade "...shot down the first tactical ballistic missile in Saudi Arabia. It was the first combat kill for Patriot." Not only was "this the first time a Patriot [had] been fired in anger,...it [was] the very first time one missile in combat [had] engaged and killed another missile." During the 6-week Gulf War campaign, 158 PATRIOT missiles were launched to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles. Initially, Army sources claimed an interception success rate of 95 percent for both Saudi Arabia and Israel.The Army has subsequently revised this figure downward to a 70 percent success rate for Saudi Arabia and a 40 percent rate for Israel. Because of the system's high visibility and the numerous accolades which it received throughout ODS and afterwards, the PATRIOT has become the most highly criticized of all the weapon systems used in SWA. A special report released by the Center for International and Security Policy Studies not long after the cessation of hostilities stated that although the PATRIOT "...demonstrated, for the first time in combat, that it is possible 'to hit a bullet with a bullet,' ...the interceptions also demonstrated the limits of the Patriot, even against a primitive ballistic missile such as the SCUD. Patriots hit the Iraqi missiles at too low an altitude and with insufficient power." This special report went on to argue in favor of the continued development of the U.S.-funded, Israeli-designed and developed ARROW, "a true ATBM [antitactical ballistic missile]...." Almost a year after Operation Desert Storm, critics of the missile claimed that "...the Patriot success story, a `Massachusetts miracle,' is sadly not based on supportable fact." According to a recent article in The Boston Globe, "...[There] is mounting evidence that the missile, the supposed high-tech hero of the Persian Gulf War, failed repeatedly and may not have succeeded even once--and that the Army and Raytheon have been trying to discount that evidence." Critics of the PATRIOT argued that the system "...could not prevent the deaths, injuries and considerable damage suffered by Israel from debris and warheads which were knocked off course but not destroyed by the interceptions." Perhaps the most damning, certainly the most emotionally charged, failure attributed to the system occurred on 26 February 1991 when the warhead and other debris from a Scud which broke apart in flight slammed into a metal warehouse in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The building had been converted into a barracks and mess hall for U.S. soldiers, 28 of whom died and 97 wounded as a result of the attack. This single event "...inflicted more casualties on American soldiers..." than 2 days of fighting during the ground war. Although located in an area where two batteries were set up, no PATRIOT missiles were ever fired at the incoming Scud. (Editor's note: No PATRIOT missiles were fired to intercept those SCUD missiles determined to be harmless, i.e., headed for the ocean or unpopulated desert areas.) In the days and weeks immediately following this tragic incident, U.S. officials searched for the reasons why the PATRIOT system was not employed to protect America's own. Preliminary analyses blamed "a breakdown in the U.S. intelligence warning system..." which failed to detect the Scud's launch from southern Iraq. Heavy cloud cover and the breakup of the missile were the reasons cited for the failure. Later, "a combination of bad weather, smoke and burning oil fields in Kuwait..." were singled out as the main factors contributing to the electronic confusion which prevented the launching of PATRIOT interceptors. In March 1991, Army officials revealed that one of the two PATRIOT batteries situated near the destroyed barracks was not operational during the fatal attack because it was undergoing periodic maintenance. Two months later, newspaper accounts reported that Army investigators had ascertained that the second battery's failure to detect the incoming Scud was the result of "...multiple computer problems, including four days of continuous operation...." Actually, the investigators had known within 3 days of the tragedy that a technical problem was at the root of the PATRIOT system's nonperformance, but it took several more weeks to pin point the precise software glitch responsible for the malfunction. In February 1992, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report confirmed that "...the failure could have been averted... if U.S. Army operators had received instructions to reset the system every few hours." The GAO findings supported "...an earlier Army conclusion that a communications snafu, rather than an inherent flaw in the Patriot system, was the main cause of the disaster...." Despite this tragic occurrence, many of the men and women stationed in SWA, even those in Dhahran on the night of the fatal Scud attack, maintained their conviction that the PATRIOT was indeed an effective deterrent against Iraq's dreaded missiles. One Redstone Arsenal soldier who was there on the night of 26 February later described the event for the post newspaper: "When it first hit [the building next door], there was no siren or anything. We thought it was just a Patriot hitting another Scud, knocking another Scud down. But when we went outside to check everything out, we saw the building burning.... It shocked me because I never thought I'd be so close to a place where a Scud hit. I never thought one would get through. I felt like [with] the job the Patriots had done, we'd never have a Scud to hit. I felt a lot of confidence in the Patriot--I still do, you know, it was just an unfortunate incident." The early success of the PATRIOT system surprised many people, including most of its staunchest supporters. It also quickly silenced, at least temporarily, those critics who pointed to the system "...as a prime example of a high-tech weapon that wouldn't work and cost too much...." Despite the continuing questions about PATRIOT's performance during Operation Desert Storm, the system did the job that the Army designed it to do: namely, defending high value targets such as the airfields in Saudi Arabia from which U.S. aircraft operated. The PATRIOT was never intended to protect large densely populated areas such as those targeted by the Iraqis in Israel. As the MICOM Public Affairs Office noted, "The Patriot [is] not perfect. The Army never said it was. When it was needed, it was there. And what it did was everything the Army wanted it to do." The PATRIOT missile system influenced the course of the Gulf War by providing protection to U.S. and Saudi Arabian assets. This allowed the continuation of the air campaign on the schedule set by the coalition rather than letting allied troops be prematurely drawn into a ground war on Iraqi terms.The system also contributed significantly to the strategic and political objectives of the United States by providing the ATBM defense capability necessary to keep Israel out of the conflict. According to Assistant Secretary of the Army Stephen Conver: "By smashing Scuds,... Patriot and its crews:
The SHILLELAGH is a lightweight, surface-to-surface guided missile system which was designed as the main armament for armored combat vehicles. A direct fire missile launched from a combination gun-launcher, SHILLELAGH is effective against tanks, troops, and field fortifications. Its 152mm gun-launcher can fire either missiles or conventional ammunition and provides high accuracy against moving or stationary targets. The main armament for the SHERIDAN Assault Vehicle, the missile is guided to its target by a command system mounted on the launching vehicle. It is capable of maneuvering in flight to attack a moving target. First fielded 23 years ago, the SHILLELAGH is currently used only by the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne Division. Deployed with the division during both Operation Just Cause and ODS, the SHILLELAGH was not fired in combat during the Persian Gulf conflict. The STINGER Reprogrammable Microprocessor (STINGER-RMP) is a manportable, shoulder- fired air defense system which provides defense for ground forces against attack by low-flying aircraft. It uses an infrared and ultraviolet homing guidance system which operates independently after the gunner aims and launches the missile. The missile homes in on the heat of the target aircraft. The Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force all use STINGER. The Army also uses the missile to arm helicopters for air-to-air combat. STINGER has been sold to Germany, Israel, Japan, and other countries. The first combat use of the basic STINGER weapon system by U.S. troops occurred with the deployment of 27 STINGER teams in the U.S. airborne assault against Cuban and local forces on the Caribbean island of Grenada on 25 October 1983. The system also proved very effective against first line Soviet combat aircraft in Afghanistan. Deployed during both Operation Just Cause and ODS, the STINGER-RMP "...provided highly mobile and lethal short range air defense protection to the maneuver forces" during the Gulf War. There were also 66 OH-58C Army scout helicopters equipped with air-to-air STINGER deployed during ODS. Even before reaching the theater of operation, the STINGER was employed in a defensive posture. Soldiers from Headquarters Company, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor, 24th Infantry Division were detailed with the Military Sealift Command's ship Regulus "...to assist loading, unloading and escorting the ship's load of more than 700 tanks, fighting vehicles, and trucks headed for Saudi Arabia...." They were responsible for defending the ship once it entered the Persian Gulf. Among the "...weapons available for the defense of the ship were STINGER missiles...." Because of the lack of targets for most of the air defense weapons deployed to SWA, however, no STINGER-RMP missiles were fired during Operation Desert Storm. This is a lightweight, highly mobile and transportable surface-to-air missile/.50 caliber machine gun system. It is operated by a two-man crew for defense against helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft at low altitude in day or night operations and in clear or adverse weather. The system is mounted in a turret configuration on a HMMWV. The 48 AVENGERs deployed to SWA with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cavalry Division were instrumental during ODS combat operations. The AVENGER system "...performed exceptionally. Its operational availability exceeded all requirements. Ground force commanders relied on Avenger to provide air and ground surveillance during night and limited visibility conditions." Like most of the other air defense systems deployed to SWA, however, the AVENGER was not fired in combat because of a lack of targets. The TOW is a crew portable, vehicle-mounted, heavy anitarmor weapon system consisting of a launcher and one of five versions of the TOW missile. It is designed to defeat armored vehicles and other targets such as field fortifications from ranges up to 3,750 meters. After firing the missile, the gunner must keep the cross hairs of the sight centered on the target to ensure a hit. The system will operate in all weather conditions in which the gunner can see a target throughout the missile flight by using either a day or night sight. The TOW system is used on the HMMWV, the M151 jeep, the armored personnel carrier, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) COBRA helicopters, the ITV, and the U.S. Marine Corps light armored vehicle. Three of the five TOW missile versions--Basic TOW, Improved TOW and TOW 2--are no longer being produced for U.S. forces. However, these versions are still used by 40 allied countries. In the late 1980s, the prime contractor for the TOW weapon system began producing the TOW 2A "...which gives the capability to defeat reactive armor." The TOW 2B, which will provide "...additional capability against future armored threats, ..." began production as an engineering change proposal to the FY 1990 production contract. In May 1972, U.S. soldiers initially used the TOW in combat during the Vietnam War. This was the very first time that American troops had ever fired an American-made missile under wartime conditions. The system has also seen action in various clashes between Israel and Syria as well as during the Iran/Iraq war. In Saudi Arabia the system was represented by [the HMMWV] with the light forces, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle with the heavy forces, Improved TOW Vehicle with some of the forces, and the Cobra-mounted version. The TOW was one of the earliest missile systems to arrive in SWA "because of the large Iraqi armored threat...[It] was deployed with some of the first units in Saudi: the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Mechanized Division and the101st Airborne Division.... Thousands of missiles and hundreds of launchers..." were used during Operation Desert Storm. Forces of other countries, including Saudi Arabia, also had TOW at their disposal. Despite early reports of the problems being experienced by U.S. Army and Marine Corps units in hitting targets during live-fire exercises "...because soldiers [lacked] experience firing the weapon..." as well as Iraqi use of "...'dazzlers' intended to interfere with the guidance of Army TOW missiles and other antitank missiles," the TOW during ODS was a primary killer of Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers,and other vehicles. Before the start of the coalition air campaign in January 1991, "...Army and Marine Corps planners...noted a trend of improvement as more and more units [had] the opportunity to practice firing the TOW." The Iraqi use of dazzlers also proved to be of little concern to coalition commanders. According to Dave Harris, MICOM Public Affairs Officer, "The purpose of the dazzler is to confuse the missile guidance system so it loses track of the missile. It's a technology we knew about many years ago. It does not work against the TOWs we used in Southwest Asia.... We knew the Iraqis had these devices, but we weren't concerned about them. We've had no reports since the war that any of these were effective in any way against TOWs. Before the start of the actual ground offensive, U.S. Marine units successfully employed the TOW against various Iraqi targets. On 18 January 1991, newspapers reported that "U.S. Marine Corps AH-1T Cobra helicopter gunships destroyed an Iraqi command post following Iraq's sporadic shelling of the Khafji area near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.... Four Cobra gunships destroyed a building used as an Iraqi command post with TOW missiles." Accounts told by Gulf War veterans who witnessed the TOW in action during the fighting revealed several instances where TOWs "...did things that surprised the engineers who designed them more than the soldiers who fired them." TOW missiles proved to be a determining factor in the first ground engagement of Operation Desert Storm. During the Battle of Khafji, which took place before the start of the actual ground offensive, the TOW demonstrated a pretty unique ability: " ...[T]he Saudis fought Iraqi tanks with TOW missiles and drove them out of the city. At one point in the battle, the Saudis saw Iraqi soldiers on top of a water tower. Not wishing to blow up the tower, the Saudis fired a TOW, blew the ladder off the tower and left the Iraqis stranded until the end of the battle." The lethality of the TOW missile was proven beyond doubt during the 100-hour ground campaign when one of the antitank munitions fired by U.S. troops "...went right through the tank it was aimed at and penetrated another tank parked next to it.... Another TOW went through a six foot dirt berm and knocked out an Iraqi armored personnel carrier on the otherside." In both instances, the TOW performed a feat which it supposedly was incapable of accomplishing. Even without these rather unusual and certainly unexpected displays of its effectiveness, "the TOW did fantastic, better than expected," according to Desert Storm veterans. The system's deadly accuracy proved to be unstoppable even "...out to its maximum effective range and under degraded visibility conditions." One Huntsville, Alabama, native who fought as part of a TOW/Bradley unit, related that the TOW "...was real powerful hitting because you could tell as soon as it hit, the vehicle was dead." Of the seven Iraqi vehicles destroyed by the soldier's BFV, four of the targets involved were T72 tanks, where the missile "...completely blew off the turret..." of three of the tanks. He also reported that TOW missiles were able to kill targets while the Bradley was on the move as well as cut down at least one while it was moving. Obstacles, Challenges, Observations Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was one of the most demanding deployments in U.S. Army history in terms of both the distance involved and the speed at which a large number of troops and materiel had to be moved. The "...long air and sea lines of communication, harsh operational environment of the Southwest Asian desert, and extended duration of employment presented a formidable sustainment challenge" to the Army organizations at Redstone Arsenal. The U.S.-led coalition effort to liberate Kuwait offered the Army a unique opportunity to demonstrate its methods and munitions as well as a chance to study how well its high-tech weaponry performed in combat. The rapidly changing requirements of modern warfare, however, placed a heavy burden on those commands whose primary missions involved the management, logistical, readiness, and acquisition support needed to maintain the operational effectiveness of the technologically sophisticated weapon systems deployed during ODS. The severe desert environment of the Persian Gulf region and the immaturity of the logistical theater of operations were two of the most formidable sustainment obstacles confronting MICOM and the PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support, along with their respective project offices. Environmental Stress At the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, Army officials anticipated some problems with such environmental hazards as shimmering heat waves that might fool optical sights and antitank gunners or with dust that might hamper the functioning of laser target designators. Because its missiles are routinely tested and fired under harsh desert conditions, however, the Army expected that systems which "...have accumulated years of operating experience...in that kind of environment," would function with little difficulty in the heat and sand of Saudi Arabia. Environmental stress to all of the Army missiles in SWA was caused by the area's periodic sandstorms and unrelenting heat. The reality of the Persian Gulf's extremely harsh surroundings elicited the observation that Army missile systems, most of which had been designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe, needed to be made more robust at extreme temperatures and under extreme environmental conditions. Among the numerous problems caused by heat, dust, and sand were the overheating of the FLIR due to failure of the internal cooling unit; exuding of cast loaded explosives for warheads due to soaking at 100o to 155o F; softening of the ablative panels on the MLRS; degrading of NICAD batteries recharging above 90o F; loss of warhead penetration performance at high temperatures; and possible danger during missile firings if storage and operational temperatures were too high. In addition, the AVENGER system's lenses were damaged by sand and its hand held display blanked out in the sunlight. The internal temperatures of the AVENGER trucks also soared to 130o F, "...making it difficult for soldiers to operate." Missile Command and PEO/PM personnel both in theater and at Redstone Arsenal rose to this environmental challenge to system readiness by devising solutions or verifying fixes developed by soldiers in the field. For example, when sand and dust clogged HAWK air filters and froze MLRS cable reels, special cleaning techniques were initiated. One rather innovative approach used by soldiers assigned to a PATRIOT unit involved spraying Endust (the dusting/polishing cleaner for wooden furniture and other surfaces) on cheese cloth used to cover inlet air filters in order to capture fine dust particles. Replaced two to three times a day, the treated cloths could be washed and reused after drying for up to a week before a new piece of cloth was necessary. To alleviate the excessive temperatures inside the AVENGER truck, the STINGER Project Office contracted with a small business to design and produce an air conditioning unit for the system. When MLRS and Army TACMS temperature caution and danger flags activated at 147o and 165o F, respectively, leading to a possible launch abort, an alternate firing sequence was implemented to circumvent the problem. Because of the high temperatures, TOW-DRAGON repairmen in SWA experienced trouble in adjusting the Night Sight Imager. Their request for help was passed on to MICOM by LARs in theater. The WSMD Close Combat Systems Office designed an imager focusing tool, a small number of which were fabricated then handcarried to SWA by the G/VLLD modification team. Other operational and storage procedures modified to alleviate environmental stress on fielded missile systems included the installation of solar shrouds; use of tarps as equipment sun protectors; retrofit of stainless steel plates; use of lens covers or other protective covering; use of sunlight-insensitive displays; and separation of components to allow for ventilation.
Logistically Immature Theater of Operations The deployment of several sophisticated missile systems to a logistically immature theater of operations also created a whole host of challenges for MICOM, the PEOs, and the PMs. For example, the inability to purchase needed materials off the economy caused problems with the procurement of materials not readily available through the normal supply system. Some requisitions did not reach the appropriate supply source, while the aerial point of arrival was unable to distribute many of the items received. Delays in the receipt of Logistic Information Files, which were needed so units would know the status of their documents in order to properly manage their maintenance needs, also impacted readiness. The failure of previous maintenance and logistical planning training to account for the possibility of large-scale deployment to a logistically immature theater of operations also adversely affected weapon systems readiness. When many units received their notifications of deployment to SWA, insufficient emphasis was placed on logistics and maintenance. Some units, for example, deployed with some equipment in a non-operational state because maintenance was performed primarily on an "as required" basis. Consequently, maintenance necessary to bring the equipment to peak operational readiness rates had to be completed in a hurried-up fashion after the units reached Saudi Arabia. Intensive pre-deployment training also increased repair parts usage, but there was no adequate management for the replenishment of items before units shipped out to the Persian Gulf. Additional maintenance problems involved the lack of adequate training for all Direct Support- Combat Support Company personnel as well as some deficits in required tools and special test equipment. In a logistically immature theater, problems at this level of maintenance meant that no one else could repair items, with the net result that some items were not available for tactical operations for an extended period of time. Some maintenance crews supported by MICOM LARs were also hampered by the assignment of unexpected missions once they were deployed, while others performed maintenance in the open on the sand because they did not check their tentage before deploying to SWA. Other maintenance delays were caused by the slow turnaround in the evacuation of some unserviceable repairables from the theater of operations and by lags in moving vehicles carrying technical supplies and repair parts from the port of entry to operational areas. Many of the logistical and maintenance problems encountered in SWA, however, were the result of inadequate or inapplicable planning for an operation the size of Desert Shield/Desert Storm in a theater of operations like the Persian Gulf. Acquisition, Production, and Technical Challenges In addition to the environmental obstacles encountered in the Persian Gulf region and the logistical immaturity of the theater of operations, MICOM, the PEOs, and the PMs had to surmount a variety of acquisition, production, and technical hurdles occasioned by the war. Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm presented all of the Army agencies connected with the missile programs managed at Redstone Arsenal with the greatest wartime challenge in their respective histories. The history of Redstone Arsenal's ODS role contains many examples of the outstanding efforts made by installation personnel in support of the soldiers deployed to SWA. Army TACMS. Through the cooperation and dedication of the Army TACMS Project Office, the prime contractor, and the contracting officer, Army TACMS production was accelerated to support ODS. On 15 September 1990, the production contract was modified to accelerate the delivery of 20 M39 Guided Missile and Launching Assemblies from CY 1991 to CY 1990. The contract was modified again on 28 January 1991 to accelerate delivery of another 48 M39s to be completed by May 1991. When Operation Desert Shield began in August 1990, the Army only had 20 Army TACMS missiles in its inventory. "By the end of the ground war, however, LTV [the prime contractor] had assembled and shipped 105 missiles to the Middle East." Between August 1990 and February 1991, LTV also responded on short notice to multiple requests to accelerate deliveries of Army TACMS spare parts and divert shipments of M39s for delivery to SWA in support of ODS. In addition, the contractor provided support to the Army Depot in Germany so that checkout and repair of the M39s could be accomplished quickly and returned to Saudi Arabia with minimal delay. Not only were the aforementioned accomplishments achieved with a system in an early production phase but this successful effort was completed without sacrifice to the reliability and integrity of the missile system. In fact, the Army TACMS proved to be one of the most outstanding high- tech systems deployed to SWA. CHAPARRAL. On 30 November 1990, MICOM informed DA that the contractor would accelerate delivery of CHAPARRAL missiles in support of ODS. The contractor expected to deliver 24 missiles in January 1991 and 28 more the following month. Higher headquarters subsequently approved the accelerated delivery schedule. HAWK. In June 1989, the U.S. Army Tank-Automative Command (TACOM) fielded a new 5-ton truck, the M-939-A2, as a replacement for the older M-809 series. The new truck had a higher road clearance than the older model thus was better suited for off-road operations. The new truck was used as the prime mover for the HAWK carrier or trailer. However, the trailer hitch pintle on the M-939-A2 is 35.5 inches above the ground, compared with the M-809's 28.75 inches. The increased angle of pull on the lunette assemblies caused excessive stress on this part of the HAWK carrier. In addition, the new truck was capable of traveling over more rugged terrain than that for which the HAWK carriers were designed. The combination of these two factors caused the lunette assemblies on a number of HAWK carriers to be cracked, bent, or destroyed after being towed by the M-939-A2 series trucks. On one occasion the missile trailer flipped after the lunette broke, destroying the three HAWK missiles it was carrying. The height of the M-939-A2 truck also prevented the driver from seeing the towed load. The Missile Command suggested a modification in how the HAWK launcher was towed by the new truck. HELLFIRE. The HELLFIRE system, the first and last weapon fired during the war, was very effective during Operation Desert Storm. However, some problems with the system's readiness and use were encountered in conjunction with the Persian Gulf conflict. Between 9 November 1990 and 15 January 1991, the HELLFIRE Project Office offered equipment checkout assistance to units alerted for deployment to SWA. Findings from the assistance visits indicated serious readiness problems with the HELLFIRE/APACHE subsystem. Of the 54 aircraft checked by pre-deployment assistance technical represent- atives, 18 (or one- third of those checked) were found to have reduced missile launch capability; 10 launchers were found to be unserviceable. To address this problem, the project office dispatched a contractor technical representative contact team to SWA from December 1990 through January 1991. A total of 114 aircraft were checked out, with 41 HELLFIRE system defects and 14 aircraft electrical problems discovered. The team made the necessary adjustments and repairs to restore the units to a high readiness posture. The technical representative team used the TS-803 contractor set, which is sensitive and requires close calibration, to make its readiness evaluations. The HELLFIRE system showed shortcomings in its ability to be tested and proven operational with the existing onboard diagnostic equipment. As a result of this ODS experience, the project office began developing a combat worthy test unit for use on the deployed HELLFIRE/APACHE subsystem. On 27 February 1991, during an attack on the Al-Hammar causeway bridge, APACHE helicopter pilots from Fort Rucker, Alabama, watched in amazement as one HELLFIRE missile "...left its launch rail and streaked up into the afternoon sky until it disappeared.... Two other missiles left the launch rails in a crazy spiral and plowed into the sand a few hundred yards away." This seemingly erratic behavior was not the result of a problem with the missiles themselves. It was indicative of a backscatter situation. Backscatter is the term given to laser or light energy refracted for particulate matter in the air. The problem was intensified in SWA by the vast areas covered by fine sands and the need for the helicopters to hover at relatively low altitudes while locating and engaging targets. The HELLFIRE Project Office correctly diagnosed that the missiles were not behaving erratically after firing but were, in fact, following the laser beam they detected. Although all APACHE helicopter pilots had been taught to be alert for possible backscatter situations, the project office sent a contractor representative from Rockwell International Corporation to SWA to reemphasize backscatter countermeasures that would improve pilot and missile performance. Also during ODS, there were a series of inadvertent launches experienced with the HELLFIRE missile system. The project office initiated a program to determine the exact cause of these unplanned launches as well as a modification program on the forward wiring harness of the electronic control systems processor, a major portion of the HELLFIRE launcher. The latter modification effort was tentatively scheduled to begin in June 1992 and would involve all HELLFIRE launchers in the field and in depot inventories. HYDRA-70. The HYDRA-70 (2.75-inch) rockets continue to be a viable munition for attack helicopters against soft and medium hard targets. The MK66 motor, with its extended range coupled with a standard HEPD (high explosive point detonating) warhead, provided excellent suppressive fire to allow the HELLFIRE missiles to be managed for use on exact and hardened targets. The HYDRA-70 HEPD stock asset position at the onset of Operation Desert Shield was less than acceptable; however, through the exploration of multiple courses of action, production of these rockets was accelerated to a safe position by the beginning of Operation Desert Storm. In addition, the new HYDRA-70 multipurpose submunitions rocket, which was in production when Operation Desert Shield began, was cleared for conditional release in SWA. This new munition's performance met expectations and proved to be popular with the pilots. MLRS. Development of protection for the exposed areas of the MLRS missile launcher system from the extremely high velocity gases resulting from rocket motor operation has been a high priority for the MLRS Project Office. Prior to ODS, only neoprene ablative panels were available to prevent burn through during firing. These panels provide protection for 108 rounds. This limitation was acceptable in peacetime with limited live fires, but imposed severe restraints in battle. Because of this shortcoming, development of new blast protection for the MLRS to provide increased capability was given top priority. The result of this enhanced effort was stainless steel panels which afford a substantial improvement in the system's war fighting capability, cost savings, and reduction in maintenance downtime. The panel design goal of providing protection for the firing of up to 540 rockets was exceeded. During tests at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), approximately 700 rounds have been fired with no degradation of the panels. The metal blast protection was planned for retrofit of the MLRS fleet starting in FY 1992. With the onset of ODS, however, the MLRS Project Office and the MICOM MLC took action to procure 238 retrofit kits to be delivered for application to launchers in Saudi Arabia. Expedited procurement resulted in the delivery of a total of 69 kits to SWA before the cease fire. In December 1990, a PM representative, along with seven teams from the Red River Army Depot; Mainz Army Depot; MICOM RD&E Center; and LTV Corporation, went to Saudi Arabia to apply the kits. The teams successfully completed 59 of the available launchers before the beginning of the ground offensive in February 1991. PATRIOT. The Air Defense PEO and MICOM successfully supported deployment of the PATRIOT missile system to increase the U.S. defense posture in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. Within days of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the first PATRIOT fire units were mobilized at Fort Bliss, Texas, and airlifted to Saudi Arabia. Throughout the conflict, strategically emplaced fire units provided air defense coverage 24 hours a day. Reliability and system performance exceeded that which was expected. Iraq's arsenal of tactical ballistic missiles posed an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and other surrounding Middle Eastern countries. After the decision to deploy PATRIOT to SWA had been made, it became apparent that the new PAC 2 version of the PATRIOT was needed to counter the Iraqi threat. Although it was not scheduled to begin production until 1991, the PATRIOT Project Office issued orders "...to accelerate production schedules of the...[PAC 2 missile] shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a decision that put the...[office] `out on a limb' with Pentagon officials, but got the missile defense system to the Middle East in time to shoot down Scud missiles." With the receipt of formal approval on 6 August 1990, PAC 2 production was accelerated to the point that by the following month missiles were rolling off the production line and being air transported directly to troops in SWA. The acceleration task involved the coordinated efforts of U.S. Government agencies as well as contractors in Massachusetts, Florida, Connecticut, California, Iowa, Arkansas, Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Maryland, Wisconsin, and Germany. When the first deployment alerts were issued in August 1990, "...only three pre- production PAC II missiles were ready, and they were on the...[WSMR] for testing. Some of the parts had not even begun production in the U.S." By the time the air campaign commenced on 17 January 1991, 460 PAC 2 missiles were in the hands of troops in SWA. At the heart of Patriot operations is the software which controls the radar, missiles, communications and other critical functions. This massive integration of computer code required urgent tailoring to optimize Patriot performance to the threat and conditions of the Mideast. In addition to the accelerated delivery of PAC 2 missiles, the PATRIOT Project Office also worked non-stop to coordinate the activities necessary to upgrade the system's software to allow it to function effectively in key ODS performance areas. Normally, months of testing and processing are re- quired before new software is released. In the first seven weeks alone, the project office approved six releases of new software. Ongoing improvements to this part of the PATRIOT system "...were developed under time constraints measured in days, not months." It was just this sort of software fix (which was in the process of being applied to the PATRIOT batteries in SWA) that would have helped to prevent the fatal Scud attack on the U.S. barracks in Dhahran. STINGER. In support of ODS, STINGER-RMP read only memory (ROM) modules with Version IV software were urgently needed to be delivered in the gripstocks being deployed with the shipments of STINGER-RMP missiles headed to SWA. The Module IV is the latest software upgrade that is programmed into the externally accessible module to provide the STINGER- RMP missile with increased accuracy. After this software upgrade was evaluated and validated, General Dynamics, the system's prime contractor, began producing Version IV STINGER-RMP modules in August 1990. Because the Version IV module was needed immediately to support the ODS deployment schedule, as well as to replace modules in the gripstocks of hardware already fielded, the STINGER Project Office instructed the contractor to speed up delivery of the new modules. Between November 1990 and February 1991, General Dynamics produced about 4,700 Module IVs to support Army, Navy, and Marine Corps requirements. Before acceleration, the original production schedule was set at 175 modules a month. After production was stepped up, the new schedule was initially set at 100 modules a day, 7 days a week for 5 weeks. During ODS, the STINGER Project Office initiated action to replace RMPs in those gripstocks deployed to SWA. The MSRD LARs in Saudi Arabia were trained in the procedure, transported initial quantities of RMPs to the theater of operations, and began the replacement program in SWA. The LARs replaced RMPs in STINGERs belonging to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 11th ADA, and VII Corps. Another potential problem addressed by the STINGER Project Office involved those missiles equipped with rocket motors which had been releasing fragments back on the gunner during firing. To protect the gunner's eyes from possible injury, the project office procured safety glasses and shipped them to the MICOM SCR in SWA for distribution to using units. The SCR employed AMC Logistics Assistance Officers (LAOs) and MSRD LARs to dispense the glasses to the necessary units. Before deployment to SWA, Air-to-Air STINGER systems on OH-58C/S aircraft experienced Argon bottle leakage. A fix was in process at the time of deployment. The LARs were equipped and trained on procedures for checking and repairing leaking Argon bottles in the system. All necessary actions to eliminate this problem were completed for each deployed unit. TOW. On 9 August 1990, the TOW Project Office received word that the 82d, 101st, and 24th Divisions and the 197th Brigade would immediately deploy to SWA. The 1st Cavalry Division, elements of the 2d Armored Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would follow soon thereafter. Analysis showed that, with the exception of the 82d Airborne Division, none of the deploying units had the latest version of the TOW 2 missile guidance set (MGS). The new MGS's software allowed the gunner to track a target through the optical path bending heat waves rising from the ground in a desert environment. In addition, modification kits to begin Army-wide modification of the missile case loading rails in the turret of the M-901-A1 ITV were ready for installation. This rail modification allowed TOW 2A missiles to load into ITV turrets without binding despite missile cases that were at the maximum width tolerance. Because MICOM anticipated short notice equipment fieldings to the deploying units, the command's MLC in conjunction with Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) moved quickly to begin a 24- hour equipment modification program. The command also coordinated with TACOM for release of the ITV rail modification kits to the Anniston TOW technician's shop and established a requirement for an expedited shipping schedule. On 10 August 1990, after reviewing the status of the TOW weapon system, DA directed the TOW Project Office to apply the needed modifications immediately and to take all steps necessary to complete these modifications before the units deployed. The TOW PM, having anticipated these directions from higher headquarters, dispatched equipment, fielding officers, and technicians to Forts Stewart and Benning in Georgia to hand off the new MGSs and to apply the ITV rail modification. Additional teams traveled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Hood, Texas. Work at the first three installations was finished within 3 days without disrupting the deploying divisions' critical movement schedules. The Fort Hood team completed its mission on 17 August 1990. During ODS, the TOW Project Office received intelligence assessments that identified the presence of laser range-finders on Iraqi tanks that posed an eye damage threat to gunners looking through optical telescopes like those on the TOW 2 optical sight. Logisticians for the system developed a plan to apply the first deliveries of optical sight objective lenses with laser protective coating to the units that had just deployed to Saudi Arabia. The plan called for ANAD to install the protective lenses in optical sights from depot stocks which the project office would then ship to SWA in division sets. The MICOM LARs would exchange these items with the unmodified sights and then ship the latter back to ANAD for modification. Once this exchange was completed, the sights would be shipped back to SWA for use by the remaining units deployed in the theater of operations. Once the first division set was ready for shipment, the TOW Project Office sent a fielding officer to Dover Air Force Base (AFB) to expedite shipment to SWA. Because this effort required almost all of the optical sights in depot stockage to make complete unit sets, the project office intensively managed the movement and exchange of these items. It was imperative that unmodified stocks be returned to stock once the exchange was completed. Despite an 8-day backlog of supplies awaiting airlift from Dover AFB, the TOW fielding officer was able to upgrade the priority of the sight ship- ment; the new sights reached Saudi Arabia within 5 days of leaving ANAD. From 1 October to 8 November 1990, the optical protection sight exchange program continued in SWA. All of the first TOW units deployed to Saudi Arabia had received modified sights by the end of November. Modification of the BFV/TOW 2 subsystem MGS was pushed to provide additional capability for deployment in support of ODS. Starting on 25 October 1990, Hughes Aircraft Company modified about 1,100 MGSs and shipped them directly to FMC Corporation for installation in the A2 BFV System for ultimate deployment to SWA. The Mainz Army Depot (MZAD) performed the MGS modification for units of the 1st Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, 3d Armored Division, and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment POMCUS (prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets) which were deployed to SWA from Germany. A team from MZAD also made two trips to Saudi Arabia to modify MGSs in the 24th Infantry Division and any units which were missed during earlier modifications.
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