REDSTONE
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At the outset, the REDSTONE program had a
range objective of 500 nautical miles. As time drew near to the actual "hardware
cutting," however, the Office, Chief of Ordnance (OCO) dictated a payload or warhead
weight that reduced the range to less than 200 nautical miles with the power plants then
available. This was in late 1950 when development of the REDSTONE was started. Although
the Army Field Forces (AFF) were now given promise of a missile weapon system with a
thermo-nuclear capability, the range was less than desired, and the REDSTONE became an
interim measure to attain at least a short-range capability. A long-range system was still
needed, and this thought was constantly in the minds of many planners. For a while, the
thinking was directed toward gaining the additional range through component redesign of
the REDSTONE. In fact, one such proposal in February 1954 was brought forth by the
Department of Army Chief of the Organization and Training Division that the warhead weight
be reduced, with a resulting range increase to 240 miles. But in May of that year, the
Department of Army (DA) decided to continue the REDSTONE as a weapons project to gain the
early thermonuclear capability. To some extent, this shifted attention momentarily away
from the REDSTONE as a possible long-range warhead carrier. |
After the DA decision, AFF embarked on a comprehensive study
project that covered an optimum family of guided missiles. One of these was a short-range
missile—75 miles—to support corps or army operations, and the CORPORAL, an on-the-shelf item, could partially meet
this requirement during the interim before replacement by the solid-propellant SERGEANT. For medium-range operations, a new missile having a
150-mile capability was proposed for support of Army and Navy group operations. What was
then considered as long-range would be achieved through development of a new 500-mile
missile to replace the REDSTONE.
The 1,000-Mile Missile
DA did not concur with AFF’s 150- and 500-mile range proposals.
Instead, they felt that efforts should be concentrated on developing one missile capable
of a 1,000-mile powered flight and of being accurately guided the last 200 miles at a
speed of Mach 3. Indications were that development of the 1,000-mile missile would start
immediately, but on 2 August 1954 the Army Chief of Staff directed further study covering
surface-to-surface missile requirements.
During the course of these events, and even prior to the dates
indicated above, personnel at Redstone Arsenal,
where most of the existing Army know-how for missile development was concentrated, advised
OCO that a 15-month study on a long-range missile had been prepared and was being
submitted for review. Also, germane to the proposed development plan was the fact that the
personnel corps at Redstone had reached a scientific point of achievement where assignment
of a challenging new project would be quite welcome. In brief, Redstone suggested that it
be directed to initiate the 1,000-mile missile development program.
The Redstone study concluded that the best approach would be the
development of a ballistic, two-stage rocket-propelled missile, with the warhead
separating from the second stage after burnout. This proposal was based on a probable need
for a controllable warhead; but, if this device were unnecessary, feasibility studies
should consider the development of a single-stage, rocket-propelled ballistic missile.
Propulsive agent proposals involved gasoline and liquid oxygen (LOX), which was consistent
with the then state-of-the-art and availability.
While these recommendations were being made, Redstone Arsenal was
becoming more and more capable of initiating the long-range missile program, for the
REDSTONE missile had, by that time, traversed a number of successful flights and could be
used as a carrier in a component development program. A suggestion to this effect was
made, especially with regard to experimental nose sections, as it was known that the
re-entry problem for long-range missiles would be difficult to solve. The initiation
seemed logical, too, from another standpoint, for North American Aviation (NAA) was on the
verge of developing a power unit capable of 135,000 pounds of thrust, which could be
either adapted to the REDSTONE or used in new missile development.
Eventually, many of the recommendations of the Redstone group were
adopted, that is, with reference to the technical pursuit, but not in 1954, for DA and DOD
felt that further study was necessary. Redstone was persistent, however, for as late as
December, proposals for long-range missile development were forwarded to OCO. Reactions
were mild.
At the outset of 1955, it appeared that the cycle of study and
propose was to continue, when OCO directed Redstone to make a study of a family of
missiles for Army use. To some extent, this did remain the pattern, but informal
information gleaned by OCO in February eventually brought changes. With regard to the
continuing studies, a July proposal for a 1,500-mile missile led to a specific development
program. As for the February item, OCO learned that the Air Force intended to invite
proposals for the development of a 1,000-mile missile using existing hardware. An
announcement had also been made in January by the Air Force confirming the fact that
Convair was working on the ATLAS 5,000-mile ICBM.
These Air Force announcements fostered a wave of activity on the
part of the Army, especially with regard to the 1,000-mile missile. To Army, depending on
the use of the 120,000-pound thrust NAA engine its facilities appeared to be the logical
site for development. It was felt that the REDSTONE could be upgraded to a two-stage
missile having a range of 1,000 miles or better. Besides, the guidance system was being
developed, and which of the hardware required for such a weapon had already been proven.
Personnel and facilities at Redstone Arsenal could admirably satisfy the requirement, and
OCO proposed that these be offered.
The 1,500-Mile Missile
The thinking in terms of range did not stop with the idea of the
1,000-mile missile, for on 14 February 1955 the Technological Capabilities Panel, commonly
known as the Killian Committee, recommended an immediate program leading to the
development of small artificial satellites and an IRBM of the 1,500-mile range class to
parallel ICBM development. Missiles of such range actively affected the concept of waging
warfare and, in this respect, the Army Deputy Chief, Research and Development (R&D),
queried OCO as to the possibility of a 1,000- to 1,500-mile missile. There were a number
of matters to be considered. For example, according to the R&D chief, airlifted
assaults over great distances might characterize Army operations, and the transport of
such weapons as the REDSTONE and SERGEANT to airheads might pose a serious logistic
problem. Therefore, the launching of a long-range ballistic missile from a relatively rear
area might prove quite effective as well as economical. Before such a concept was adopted,
however, there were salient questions to be answered. These involved the degree of
accuracy that could be achieved, reliability of guidance systems that might be employed,
and whether or not problems in either case could be speedily resolved.
This was but one move in the slightly quickened pace leading toward
action, for, on 25 March, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Training), recommended the
initiation of the 1,000- to 1,500-mile missile development program. Additionally, CONARC
began reviewing and updating its 1954 conceptions. Proposals for short range remained the
same, with the 75-mile SERGEANT being considered as the best solution to meet this
requirement. In the medium-range field, development of a 250-mile missile was proposed to
replace the suggested 150-mile weapon. As for long-range missiles, CONARC did not make a
specific suggestion. The 250-mile missile, to their thinking, deleted the 500-mile
requirement; however, they believed that the Army did require the ability to attack
targets with nuclear warheads at extremely long range.
By May 1955, Redstone Arsenal completed the study that had been
directed by OCO in January. Basically, this involved three missiles, the larger of which
was an IRBM. No commitments were immediately forthcoming from this or any of the other
preceding proposals, but at this point recommendations from widespread sources were
centering on the requirement for a long-range missile of the IRBM class. Redstone Arsenal
quite firmly believed that it had the capability to accomplish such development, so, in
June, another presentation was made to Washington officials proposing development for a
ballistic missile system of 1,000 or more nautical miles range. Throughout this study, it
was repeatedly stressed that this development could be effected by redesign of existing
components. The REDSTONE had served as an excellent laboratory and could still be used in
such a way to test and prove long-range missile components. In fact, 19 REDSTONES had been
earmarked for these purposes, especially with regard to resolving the nose cone re-entry
problem. A number of alternative methods were included as to the way in which the missile
could be employed, which involved ranges above and below the 1,000-mile mark. All of these
proposals hinged on the use of NAA’s engine, which was now rated at 135,000 pounds of
thrust and had undergone some 334 static tests. No active results came from this proposal.
Continuing with the successive monthly proposals, Redstone Arsenal,
in July, dropped all recommendations for shorter range and concentrated on the 1,500-mile
version. As to characteristics of the weapon being considered, it was to be a
single-stage, liquid-fuel ballistic rocket designed to carry a 2,000-pound payload to the
specified range. A swivel-mounted 150,000-pound thrust NAA engine would be used as the
power unit (static tests of engines of this capability had already been conducted). The
missile would have a diameter of 95 inches and a length of 1,114 inches. Propulsion would
be provided by using 45,860 pounds of JP4 as fuel and 103,120 pounds of LOX as the
oxidizer to acquire a maximum burning time of 119.3 seconds. Launching weight would be
167,000 pounds. The missile was not fin controlled but, instead, would have attached two
hydrogen peroxide vernier thrust nozzles of 1,000 pounds of thrust each. Additionally, six
small nozzles would be installed to provide spatial attitude control in pitch, yaw, and
roll. The gimbaled engines also served to assist in correcting the same problems, and the
swivel would be hydraulically activated.
The June and July proposals orally presented by Dr. Wernher von
Braun, chief of the Redstone development team, before the Armed Services Policy Council
began to interest officials at the high Washington level. Secretary of Defense Charles E.
Wilson designated Reuben B. Robertson of DOD to investigate the IRBM field. Then, OCRD
requested OCO to compile a list of facts favoring development of the 1,500-mile missile at
Redstone. OCO quickly complied, listing many of the reasons that had been included in past
studies, that is, facilities, competent personnel, and proven components that could be
redesigned. One new feature was added: that the REDSTONE missile had been transferred to a
production contractor. This meant that an industrial capability would be available when
the 1,500-missile reached that stage, an important point to be considered.
By August 1955, the matter had reached a cost study stage. In this
respect, the Army Chief of Staff requested an estimate for developing a 1,500-mile missile
at Redstone. OCO placed the cost of a six-year development program at $240 million, but
OCRD believed this to be too conservative and estimated that the costs would run between
$400 and $500 million. Redstone’s plans as of September indicated that the time frame
of the development would be somewhat telescoped, giving an Ordnance Readiness Date of 1
November 1960. This plan was based on an assumption that the starting date of the program
would be 1 October 1955 with the first flight test of a REDSTONE to support research
mission assignments for development of the 1,500-mile missile. Fifteen such vehicles would
be used in the first stage of the program. Thereafter, a 50-missile prototype test program
was contemplated. For strictly R&D purposes, there would be 40 missiles. The other 10
missiles would serve the dual purpose of R&D and engineer-user testing and would be
instrumented to satisfy both requirements. This planning was based on experience in the
REDSTONE development program, and was the basis for OCO’s $240 million estimate.
Department of Defense Decision
Now that it was generally conceded that a requirement existed for a
1,500-mile range ballistic missile, the matter at hand was the adoption of the specific
technical development pursuit from the several existing plans. For example, the
development plan proposed by the Air Force in January 1955 was still active, and OCO as
late as September was suggesting that the team at Redstone be used to accomplish the work.
Air Force officials indicated that they would like to see the team broken up and assigned
to its various activities to effect development, but Secretary of the Army Wilbur M.
Brucker objected to such fragmentation. At this point, the Secretary of Defense, Charles
E. Wilson, decided there would be two IRBM’s developed, one of which would cover
land- and sea-based requirements.
When this decision was made, DOD, in reality, had five possible
systems under consideration for the IRBM role. One was simply to use a by-product of the
ATLAS ICBM program and the others included a separate Air Force project, a United States
(US)-United Kingdom (UK) cooperative development program, a Navy ship-based ballistic
missile, and the Navy TRITON missile. Most of these courses appeared illogical to Army
technical experts. With regard to the ATLAS by-product, the high ICBM development priority
and the anticipated operational date of the ATLAS—1965—made this possibility
seem a poor choice. The UK had little experience and it would be 1965 before a product
would result from a cooperative venture. TRITON was nonballistic, so it was completely
ignored. With regard to Air Force and Navy projects, Army believed that these could be
combined and the group at Redstone Arsenal could develop and have the system available by
1960. Also—in September— Dr. von Braun gained an audience with Mr. Wilson and
pointed out that the development of the 1,500-nautical mile missile was a logical
extension of the REDSTONE program. Some effect on the development course must have
resulted from this particular presentation.
The pace accelerated in September and October 1955. An Army staff
proposal presented to DOD on 22 September called for a program embracing the
recommendations of the Redstone Group, that is, use of facilities and personnel, design
assumptions, and cost estimates. On 13 October, the same presentation was made to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Then, on the 26th, the Army Chief
of Staff announced to his key subordinates a plan to execute the 1,500-mile missile
development program, if the Army were assigned program responsibility. This plan outlined
the role that the later-to-be-activated Army Ballistic Missile Agency would play. It also
gave indications that the commanding general of this organization would be delegated
special authority, covering funding, development, and procurement actions, to execute the
program under a compressed time frame, even to requiring assistance from Army
organizations outside his immediate command.
Ways and means for conducting an IRBM development program were
available, but one major question remained to be answered. This pertained to the
employment of the missile when it had attained an operational capability. Simply stated,
who was going to fire the missile—Army or Air Force? For years now the Army
commanders had been envisioning a battlefield of considerable depth, which manifested the
necessity for a long-range missile. Secretary Brucker defended this need before the
National Security Council on 1 November, and pressed for a decision favorable to Army. The
next day, the JCS indicated to Secretary Wilson there was an urgent requirement for IRBM
development, but they could not agree as to the service to which it should be assigned. On
the 8th the DOD decision was rendered, and an Army development program was
given the "green light."
Secretary Wilson’s decision covered the long-range ballistic
missile program, which included two ICBM’s and two IRBM’s. All were to be
afforded the highest national priority, with a qualifying stipulation that the IRBM’s
were not to interfere with ICBM development. The Army, in cooperation with the Navy, was
to develop IRBM Nr 2 to achieve an early land- and sea-based capability. To direct the
program from the top level, a Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee (JANBMC) was
established, with the Secretary of Navy serving as Chairman and the Secretary of Army as
vice chairman. They, in turn, reported to the Ballistic Missiles Committee, which the
Secretary of Defense established in his own office (OSD/BMC). Secretary Brucker and
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, relayed the word to all Army elements that
the IRBM Nr 2 program with to carry top priority in the Army.
MG John B. Medaris |
Once the decision had been made, reaction was quick. In this
respect, Major General John B. Medaris was made Commanding General designee of the
to-be-formed ABMA on 22 November 1955. Exactly one month later, the general orders were
published activating ABMA, with an effective date of 1 February 1956, as a Class II
activity under the Chief of Ordnance. The fruition of Army proposals had come about,
although from a different tack than had been earlier intended. Rather than being a partner
with the Air Force for the development of a land-based IRBM, the Army team and now been
assigned the responsibility of developing an IRBM that was responsive to land and sea
requirement. |
